Sunday, August 31, 2008
Editorial: Shades of gray in the Caucasus
Much context and history have been missed in bold rhetoric by politicians about the Russia-Georgia conflict.
From the RoundTable blog
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There have been many sweeping pronouncements and bold declarations about the Russian invasion of Georgia (Sen. John McCain's "We are all Georgians," for example).
Expect more with Russia's controversial step of recognizing the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
But comprehensive news accounts of the lead-up to the battle and a deeper understanding of the history of the regions paint a far more subtle picture of the situation.
This was not merely a matter of unchecked Russian aggression against an emerging democracy, as President Bush and McCain have pictured it.
As a lengthy Washington Post article described the run-up to the hostilities, Georgia bears a good measure of responsibility.
First, though, a little history. South Ossetia has been an autonomous enclave of Georgia since the early 1920s. In the early 1990s, a civil war broke out over South Ossetia's resistance to Georgia's movement toward independence from the Soviet Union.
South Ossetia boycotted Georgia's national elections, declared itself an independent Soviet republic loyal to Moscow. The Georgian parliament then dissolved the enclave. Moscow ordered that action reversed.
Finally, a cease-fire was signed in 1992 that allowed for a Russian peacekeeping force in an Ossetian buffer zone. It has been an uneasy truce since. South Ossetians have never given up their desire to reunite with North Ossetia in Russia. Abkhaz has a similar history.
Open hostility, including skirmishes and sporadic mortar fire, have not been unusual in South Ossetia. The number of incidents began escalating this summer.
Despite the clearly disproportionate Russian response, it must be emphasized that Georgia was the aggressor in the current situation.
Georgia sent a mass of artillery, tanks and infantry to South Ossetia, launching a brutal rocket assault on Tskhinvali, a small Ossetian city.
Georgians used the BM21 multiple rocket system, which can launch 40 rockets in 20 seconds. Military experts told The Post that the system is designed for an open battlefield, not urban areas where civilian casualties would be likely.
The Russians, though, were ready. Tanks, troops and artillery from a recent annual military exercise had remained on the Ossetian border. The far superior force had a small distance to travel when word came of the Georgian build-up.
Was Vladimir Putin waiting for just such a provocation to reassert Russian influence in the region? Almost certainly. Russia maybe even intentionally provoked the Georgians. But Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili fell for the trap -- perhaps emboldened by empty rhetoric by the Bush administration assuring that, "We always fight for our friends."
Rhetoric is important. When McCain says, "We are all Georgians," that implies a level of U.S. commitment that isn't clearly warranted based on the facts and the history of this particular situation.
Yes, a resurgent and militaristic Russia, fueled by a tremendous growth in oil wealth, warrants vigilance. But McCain's description of the recent hostilities as a Russian invasion of "a small, peaceful and democratic nation" grossly oversimplifies what happened.
There were no white hats or black hats in the Caucasus. Going forward, American policy should be based on the actual events, not soaring rhetoric that bears little resemblance to reality.
