Monday, June 15, 2009
Few viable options with North Korea
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J.O. Ra
Ra is a professor and chairman of the Department of Political Science at Hollins University and is an adjunct professor in political science at Virginia Tech.
North Korea's Kim Jong-Il has again embarked on what appears to be his chronic course of addiction to the game of brinkmanship, this time with much higher stakes, what with nuclear tests in Kilju and a series of successive missile launches, the claim of an ICBM analog and the incarceration of the two captured American journalists. Why is Kim doing it again?
Contrary to what one may think, there is nothing quixotic about his behavior. What emerges from the period immediately before and after his accession to power in 1994 is a clear pattern of relationship between the threat of an ominous domestic political instability and his external posturing toward other nations.
So it is now that the all-important question of power succession is once again gripping the inner circle of Kim's government in view of his recent bout with a stroke and his obviously failing health. A compelling piece of evidence of how unsettling and unsettled this question of succession is the manifestation of the indecisive and vacillating attitude on the part of Kim himself as to who would be regarded as an acceptable heir apparent.
Only about six months ago, the heir apparent was his brother-in-law, Chang Suk-taik, the powerful chief of the nation's secret police. Shortly thereafter, however, Chang's name disappeared, mysteriously replaced by Kim's eldest son, Kim Jong-nam. He, too, was dismissed, reportedly owing to his previous illicit attempt to gain entry to Japan which marred his public image.
It took only two months to shift the "apparent" choice to Kim's second son, Kim Jong-chul, whose possibility was almost immediately discarded for the putative reason that he was "too effeminate." Finally, Kim's youngest son, 26-year-old Kim Jong-un has recently been formally announced as the next chief.
The helter-skelter saga of the search for a successor is a telling sign of the immensely precarious political power struggle within the DPRK and its unavoidable consequence of instability. Kim is not running against other nations as much as he is running from his own people.
What then is to be done?
It would be foolhardy to launch a military attack for two reasons. It would devastate the North, to be sure, but, at the same time, extensively victimize South Korea and Japan. Furthermore, it would pose a serious strain on our relationship with China, which would be directly threatened.
Given the above consideration, the best, albeit not terribly satisfying, solution is to adopt a minimalist approach at this time, ranging from complete inaction to issuance of statements of condemnations and warnings, seeking other means of forging an international solidarity of disapproval, especially that of China, a nation with a far-reaching influence on the North.
Needless to mention, it should also include a high-level approach to continue to seek the two incarcerated journalists' release as well. The net outcome of all this then would amount to an accommodation of Kim's quest for an uneventful succession of power and optimal stability of North Korea. But why would it be in our interest to do so?
The answer derives from a painfully undeniable fact that the aftermath of a potential implosion of the North would be an immeasurable disaster for China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and, ultimately, the United States. It is a painful fact for us to accept as we would be denied even a moment of celebrating the demise of the garrison state.
That I view Kim's intolerable playfulness as his desperate measure to divert the attention outwardly to placate the internal dissidents is in part supported by his recent proposal to reopen the dialogue with South Korea concerning the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Kaesong Industrial Park is being developed in a city sandwiched between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea as a collaborative economic development between the two Koreas, but it had been temporarily halted as a result of the current bellicose situation.
Note that Kim's recent offer came after the final announcement of the choice of his successor.
If my analysis is accurate -- and it is meant to be suggestion for a short term anodyne measure at this time -- it will take an informed and seasoned diplomatic design to see the merit of a least intrusive course of action and implement it.
That said, however, formulating a long-term foreign policy that addresses the serious threat of a nuclear Korean peninsula and its consequent ramification for Japan and the world is a different question altogether, and addressing it must await a set of different temporal and situational settings.
