Lindsay J. Webb

Webb is a philosophy student at the State University of New York-Oswego and an online participant in the Mental Disability Law Studies Program at New York Law School

From newspaper articles over the past few months, I gather that many individuals believe Virginia can increase both the access to and quality of mental health treatment by enlarging the scope of committable individuals. I am not sure that this is a logical step.

Simply increasing the population of folks who may be committed under this state's mental health law will not improve the quality of care or access to that care.

If there is a shortage of mental health care, then that problem must be addressed prior to changing mental health laws. Virginia must have both the financial and health care resources to improve the state's mental health care before recklessly committing a greater number of individuals to psychiatric institutions.

I am also concerned about removing the word "imminent" from the current civil commitment criteria. To leave the criteria as vague as "a danger to self or others" is asking for judicial bodies to interpret the criteria for commitment far too broadly.

I would propose something like, "poses a danger to self or others in the foreseeable future." A set of judicial instructions should follow. The "foreseeable future" could be determined by a close examination of an individual's clinical history: For example, does the individual typically decompensate clinically every four to six months and become dangerous to self or others? Is the individual decompensating now?

A set of instructions will help to clarify the commitment criteria, and tailor the legal process to meet the needs of each individual. Such instructions will also force the courts and legal representatives to spend more than just a few minutes on a commitment hearing. Of course, when faced with a lack of a clinical history, the law will need to be interpreted as is.

Finally, if the word "imminent" is to be taken out of the current law, then we are broadening the scope of individuals who may be subject to restrictions on their physical and mental liberties. In such cases, we should ask ourselves if the state is offering these individuals enough due process protections.

I hardly think that providing assigned counsel, perhaps inexperienced in mental health matters and underpaid, is enough to protect the interests of an individual facing civil commitment under new mental health law.

I believe that there should be an independent agency charged with advocating for the legal rights of individuals in civil matters including involuntary commitment, the right to refuse treatment, as well as the right to receive treatment.

Such an agency might be similar in application to the New York State Mental Hygiene Legal Service. I believe that this proposed organization will be imperative to Virginia's new mental health law. An increase both in the number and length of commitments will likely bombard current assigned counsel with hearings. A new independent court advocacy agency can bring right-to-treatment cases to the courts, hopefully emphasizing the importance of retaining financial resources and quality mental health care in the state of Virginia.