A closer look at electronic voting machines

In my Sept. 2 column, “Voting without a net,” I discussed the new electronic voting machines that approximately 50 million voters across the nation will use in the November elections, including in many Southwest Virginia localities.

I pointed out many of the real and perceived problems with these machines, including faulty hardware or software that could cause lost votes, poor security measures by the companies designing the machines, and no paper printout that the voter can use to verify that the computer correctly recorded his choices.

In response to that column, three local elections officials invited me to a meeting to show me first-hand their electronic voting machines. Roanoke County registrar Diane Henson, Botetourt County registrar Phyllis Dierschow, and Floyd County electoral board vice chair Michael Maslaney demonstrated the WINVOTE machine, one of seven electronic voting machines approved for use in Virginia.

Henson, Dierschow, and Maslaney showed me a number of features, including the eight-hour battery backups in each machine in case of power failure, how the machines store the voting information in three different electronic memory locations in case of shutdown, and how the machines allow curbside voting for the disabled and private audio ballots for the blind or visually impaired.

They also demonstrated the machines’ ability to keep electronic records of each individual ballot cast, called a “ballot image,” which can be printed out at the end of the election. The ballots are printed in random order and without any type of identification number, so that no one can match up a ballot with a particular voter, keeping the votes confidential.

Back in September, when researching my first electronic voting column, I was told by an election official erroneously that the machines did not retain a record of the individual votes cast, only a final tally of votes for each candidate. This would make recounts virtually meaningless exercises, because individual ballots couldn’t be counted.

According to representatives from the Virginia State Board of Elections who I interviewed this week, all seven approved electronic voting machines for use in Virginia retain these ballot images electronically.

This ballot record is an improvement over the old lever machines that many of these electronic machines replaced. The lever machines only recorded a running tally for each candidate, not a record of individual ballots, so if a machine malfunctioned, officials had no way to go back and count the votes.

As many reporters have stated before, the electronic machines are easy to use. And they have a number of fail-safes to make sure you don’t vote twice for the same person, to remind you if you didn’t vote for a particular office, and to let you go back and change your mind before you submit your vote.

Like any computer, electronic voting machines have tremendous time-saving and user-friendly features.

But the issue that still remains for many across Virginia and the nation (including computer scientists) is that, like any computer, electronic voting machines can produce bad data as a result of software bugs or hardware malfunctions.

In my Sept. 2 column, I pointed out instances in Georgia, Florida, and California where machines had failed and counted too many or too few votes for candidates.

The solution to possible software glitches is that every machine produce a paper printout of the voter’s selections that the voter could see but not touch, to verify that the machine recorded his votes correctly before the printout was deposited into a secure ballot box.

The problem of getting voter-verified machines with printers in Virginia is that the equipment must first be approved against a set of national standards created by the Federal Election Commission. So far, no standards have been adopted specifically for voter verification printers, and therefore no printers have been approved, according to Barbara Cockrell, Virginia’s assistant secretary for elections and training.

The reality is that no solution -- computerized, mechanical, or paper -- will ever guarantee that voting is 100 percent free from machine malfunctions or illegal tampering. Punch card machines, optical scan machines and mechanical lever machines used in the past broke down and miscounted votes. Many people don’t realize that in every major election, thousands of votes nationwide were not counted or were thrown out because of errors.

Many voter advocates agree that electronic voting machines can work if they are fitted with paper backups to at least provide a better safeguard against malfunction.

Bank computers have to be just as accurate as voting machine computers to keep track of billions of dollars in bank accounts, but have you ever had your bank tell you that “our computers are down because of some software issues ... I can’t access your account,” or “our computers show you don’t have an account with us,” or “our computers show that you haven’t made a deposit in four months” when you know you made three in the last week? You balance your paper checkbook against your statement each month, and there is a reason for that. It’s because computers and the people who operate them are not infallible.

Because many of the fixes must be done at the state and national levels, not all issues about electronic voting could be put to rest at my meeting with the local elections officials.

But Diane Henson, Phyllis Dierschow and Michael Maslaney did address many of my issues, provided in-depth information, appeared interested in hearing public concerns, and seemed devoted to ensuring that the voting process was as secure and reliable as they could make it.